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THE FOUR EQUALS: 
ANALYZING SPINOZA'S IDEA OF EQUALITY 
MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER* 
Spinoza's defense of political democracy has long been celebrated. 
And Spinoza's effort to apply the geometric method to philosophy 
is well known. But no one, to my knowledge, has examined Spinoza's 
treatment of equality, which cuts across both his metaphysics and 
political theory 1 
Analysis of Spinoza's use of equality 2 reveals that it plays four 
distinct roles in his philosophy. The sum of its four functions, how- 
ever, is greater than the parts, for equality operates throughout by 
way of analogy to provide coherence to Spinoza's world view. 
I. ELEMENTS OF EQUALITY 
Spinoza characterized four sorts of things as equal. Measurements 
can be equal. Minds have an equal capacity for reasoning. Citizens 
or groups of citizens have equal political right. And all existing 
particular things have an equal internal power by which they exist. 
1. Equality of measurement - Spinoza used equal most fre- 
quently to denote mathematic or geometric proportion. In charac- 
terizing ratios as equal s Spinoza merely adopted the seventeenth- 
century way of expressing arithmetic equation (n=n). Similarly, he 
referred to angles as equal, 4 and said a line-segment can be divided 
into equal parts, s 
These passages do not present serious interpretive problems. But 
Spinoza also extended this idea of equality and applied it to sub- 
stance. The analogical operation of this notion of equality is readily 
apparent in his early, unpublished Short Treatise on God, Man, and 
Man's lYell Being, but a similar analogizing lies behind the adoption 
of key axioms and propositions in the Ethics. 
In the Short Treatise Spinoza repeatedly asserted that there 
cannot be two equal infinite or unlimited substances (gelyke onbe- 
paalde zelfstandigheeden). Their existence would entail a contra- 
diction, for they would necessarily limit each other. 6 Thus, by 
237 
MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER 
indirect proof, Spinoza established the unity of substance. This 
curious use of equality is further illuminated by his argument that 
one substance cannot be the cause of another, because they both 
would share attributes; and this would be impossible bacause then 
both would be equal. 7 The hidden premise in both arguments is 
simply that substance cannot be equal to anything else. 
This metaphysical argument is closely bound up with the cartesian 
conception of space as not just a matrix for measurement but as 
itself a sort of unlimited thing. It would be impossible - both 
conceptually and physically - to have two infinite spaces. Con- 
sequenfly, Spinoza's equality of measurement applies only to 
relations of limitations of space. This is consistent with his rejection 
of the real divisibility of substance, s for if an area comprised in- 
t~mite units, it (like unlimited substance) could not be equal to 
another. 9 
2. Equality of reasoning minds - Reasoning minds are equal in 
two possible ways. First, all people have an inherently equal capacity 
for reasoning. Spinoza expressed this equality or ratiocination 
mythologically by the equality of creation. Second, to the extent 
that people are rational, they wili agree - their ideas will coincide 
and they will live in social harmony. 1~ However, Spinoza only 
referred to the equality of minds in the context of discussing their 
rational potential. 
The rejection of election (of both individuals and nations) is 
central to the social ethic Spinoza developed in his political writings. 
And at the bottom of his project of scriptural criticism is the assump- 
tion that "the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to 
every man . . .,,u Although this is rooted in Spinoza's conception 
of reason itself, he defended it polemically by reference to scripture, 
which declares (according to Spinoza) that God created all people 
with equal intellects) 2 Spinoza also adduced scriptural authority 
f 13 for the equality o nations. 
But people and nations are equal for Spinoza only potentially. 
He sharply' distinguished the actual psychological constitution of 
persons, which is inherently unequal, from their potential. He asso- 
ciated equality with reason and cognition, and associated inequality 
with the passions and imagination. 14 Yet he characterized reasoning 
minds as equal only in contexts where reason is still confronted 
by the passions - in contexts where people are not actually equal. 
And he characterized minds that actually attain the highest level of 
rationality not as equal (nor as unequal) but as free or blessed)S 
His treatment of the equality of ratiocination parallels the equal- 
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ity of  measurement, where equality was restricted to proportions of  
f'mitude. Minds are equal in their reasoning only so long as the 
reasoning is potential not actual. The actual free reasoning mind, 
like extension, can only be self-determined. The category of equality 
simply does not apply. Spinoza turns to religious metaphors. 16 
3, Equality of right - Spinoza characterized people in the state 
of  nature as equals. 17 He understood the state of nature to be a real 
historical moment. Is Prior to the formation of the state, each person 
had an equal natural right to exist and act according to his or her 
natural conditions. But in such a state people were determined by  
the passions not by reason. 
Moreover, for Spinoza the state of nature was marked by actual 
material inequality. Indeed, he explained the origin of political 
society as a response to this inequality, motivated by the benefits 
resulting from the division of labor - "for all men are not equally 
apt for work (aeque apti). . . , ,zo 
Equality of right continues after the establishment of the state, 
for the natural fight of individuals continues after the creation of 
political society. 21 But this equality remains inherently limited. 
Within society the passions (especially vanity) oppose the natural 
equality of persons. 22 Spinoza described the history of the decline 
of  the Hebrew state as the result of social inequality that resulted 
from the elevation of the Levites into a special caste, z3 And he 
designed many of the political mechanisms elaborated in the Political 
Treatise specifically to promote political, social and material equal- 
ity and to counter the anti-egalitarian, socially dislocative forces 
engendered by the passions. ~ 
Nevertheless, though equality is in some sense an incident of good 
political organization, it is not, for Spinoza, the goal of politics. 
Rather Spinoza defined the best state in terms of conditions for 
freedom and reason. Within such a state people will live in harmony 
(concorditer). 2s He refrained from characterizing such a relationship 
as one of political equality (or inequality). 
4. Equality of internal power of existing - Spinoza's treatment 
of equals in his mature writings is closely related to his theory of 
contingents. All individual things exist rather than not by an internal 
power of self-persistence or self-preservation. And all existing things 
are equal with respect to the internal force by which they endure .26 
This internal force represents a modification of what Spinoza 
had termed "special divine providence" in the Short Treatise. 2v In 
that essay Spinoza rejected the explanation of particulars through 
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generals and denied the existence of generals. 2s Instead he related 
the ultimate cause of the existence of things immediately to their 
comprehension by the totality (God or nature). 29 In this scheme, 
individuals derived existence only from participating in the totality, 
but the existence of the whole was itself a function of "divine 
providence" - the striving of all reality to persist in existence. This 
striving was manifest in individuals as the special divine providence. 
In later writings Spinoza rejected this scheme and emphasized 
the source of existence as an internal power. 3~ Though in the 
Ethics he continued to identify the power by which individuals 
exist with the power of God or nature, he stressed that this power 
operates not as the immediate manifestation of the inf'mite power 
but only as that power acting through the individual's own essence .31 
The internalization of this force is accompanied by its limitation to 
the particular existing thing. "And only after this theoritieal shift 
did Spinoza characterize the power by which particular individuals 
exist as equal. 
As with Spinoza's other uses of equality, the particulars are equal 
in one aspect at the same time that they are most profoundly 
unequal in others. Individual things differ from the absolute in their 
transience; and they are not equal in essence, location or length 
of  duration. Equality, again, is a function of  limitation. 
II. PROPERTIES OF THE COMPOUND 
Equality plays an important function in Spinoza's writings in two 
ways. First, he draws certain inferences from the equality of sets of 
things and transfers them to related sets of things. Thus he extends 
the equality of geometric proportions to arguments about the nature 
of substance. Substance, as cartesian extended stuff, is ~rnilar to 
Euclidean space, likewise, from. the idea of equal political right 
rooted in a descriptive theory-of natural law, Spinoza draws specific 
institutional consequences. The continuity of political society with 
the state of  nature supports this analogical transference. 
Second, equality as a single type of relationship acts analogically 
to relate the diverse types of things that are characterized as equals 
throughout Spinoza's writings. In this way, the idea of equal pro- 
vides thematic coherence to the system as a whole. 
Geometric equality is the root analogy from which Spinoza 
draws immediate ontological consequences. The equality of ratio- 
cination is the psychological complement of the equality of political 
fight. The equality of political right is itself a sort of subset of the 
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equality of the internal power by which particulars exist; it is the 
fight of those particulars (people) who share the equality of ratio- 
cination. The analogical square doses on itself, for the equal power 
by which particulars exist supports that existence of the limited 
parts which the equality of proportion measures in geometry, a2 
There are common features to all these relations and to the over- 
arching analogical function that equality plays in Spinoza's thought. 
Above all, equality relates things or ideas that are limited. But there 
is pervasive ambiguity regarding the source of this limitation - 
whether the equals are themselves objectively limited, or whether 
the limitation itself is a function of the heuristic process of judging 
them to be equals. Conceptual instability of the compound of 
equality stems from an ambiguity in Spinoza's root concept of 
geometric equality, which is never resolved. The ambiguity becomes 
aggravated by the extension of equality to political relations. In 
establishing the reality of political right, the basic analogy threatens 
to dissolve. But at the same time Spinoza has generated a rich 
category for political theory. 
1. The truth of equality - Spinoza seems to imply in one passage 
that geometric equality is a sort of what we might call an analytic 
judgment a prmrL He says that the affirmation that the interior 
angles of a triangle equal tw~ right angles is simply a function of the 
idea of  a triangle. Converesely, the idea of the triangle is a function 
of the affirmation that its three interior angels equal two right 
angles. He calls this affirmation the "essence" of a triangle) 3 He 
does not elaborate, but he seems to be saying that the judgment is 
immediately derivable from the definitions of line and angle that 
make up the triangle. 
But it is clear from another passage that by "essence" Spinoza 
mens something other than geometric equality. For in discussing the 
circle, he criticizes the definition of it as a figure resulting from line- 
segments of equal length drawn from a central point. This definition, 
he says, fails to explain the circle and is really only one of its 
properties. Instead he defines a circle as a figure described by a line- 
segment one end of which is fixed and one end free. 
r I = r 2 = r 3 = r 4, etc. r, [~ff~.~ 
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r I - r] 
The second definition, he says, comprises the proximate cause, and 
all the properties of the circle can be derived from it. a4 
The special status of  the second definitioia is related to the fact 
that it describes the actual process by which a circle is drawn with a 
compass. But more important, it reveals the way in which Spinoza 
believes we cart imagine the circle. Just as he avoids talking of areas 
as equal and rejects the possibility of equating inf'mites, he rejects 
the first definition. The first definition can only generate a con- 
tinuous circumference if an infinte number of lines extend from the 
center. But Spinoza rejects this infinite divisibility of space - into 
either point or line. 3s 
Spinoza obviously does not consider the role of equality in the 
two definitions of the circle as identical. Although they relate 
purely geometric proportions, one is mere attribure, the other 
proximate cause (or essence). The attribute is derivable from the 
essence. But, in contrast to the definition of the triangle, the deriva- 
tion is not symmetrical. 
Spinoza's preference for the second dermition of the circle 
incorporates assumptions about the psychology of imaginative think- 
ing. Spinoza believes that geometric figures are produced by imagin- 
ative thought in terms the imagination can depict - finite line, 
motion, fLxed point. The definition, like the idea, is synthetic. And, 
I think, turning again to Spinoza's discussion of  the triangle, we can 
see that it, too, mirrors the process by which the imagination 
constructs the triangle from lines: 
~ "  c~bc. k c ~\ 
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Although the relations within each step of the retrospective analysis 
involve relations of  equality, equality is only involved in the defini- 
tion of the "essence" (a + b + c) because it is a reproduction of the 
original equality, as identity (k), which is posited in step one as the 
angle of a line (abe = k). Similarly, the equality of the radii of the 
circle is merely a function of the original definition of the "cause" 
of the circle - the single line segment is identical as it moves to 
create the circle. Retrospectively the distances it occupied at any 
moment are equal. But it is impermissible to conclude that there 
really are infinite radii of equal length from which the triangle is 
constructed. Equality is not a function of the synthetic and imagin- 
ative process by which geometric figures are formed; rather it is a 
judgment made retrospectively and analytically. 
Moreover, the conclusion I am drawn to, that equality does not 
correspond to the process of geometric definition, is confirmed by 
Spinoza's discussion in another passage of the psychology of space. 
He says that all objects a certain distance from the observer (about 
200 feet) appear equally distant. ~ Passing over whether this is true, 
or what it means for psychology, the interesting fact is that Spinoza 
selects equality as an example of confused ideas. Equality can (in 
Spinoza's parlance) be false. 
Spinoza characterizes the objects of geometry (quantity and 
measure) as modes of imagination, which result from the abstraction 
of substance into extension and duration, s7 It is possible to delimit 
and quantify this extension, once it is thinkable, but equality, too, 
clearly remains a product of  imaginative thinking. From the higher 
consideration of substance by means of the intellect, substance is 
"infinite, indivisible and unique. ' '~  The intellect - the generative 
source of philosophical knowledge - cannot comprehend by means 
of the use of equality .39 
2. The reality of equality - The status of  the relationship of 
equality even within the imaginative or phenomenal world is 
ambiguous. The ambiguity stems from Spinoza's theory of relations. 
In the Improvement of the Understanding Spinoza did not get 
past a prelimiriary classification of knowledge in terms of types of 
ideas and their corresponding definitions. But he did announce there 
the goal of  ordering all ideas so that they correspond to the order of 
nature. And he suggested two different ways that this subjective 
coherence could be achieved. On the one hand, he proposed the 
investigation of  the essence of the unitary cause of all ideas: "then 
our mind will to the utmost extent relect nature. ''4~ This project 
corresponds to the faculty of intellection. On the other hand, 
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Spinoza insists that only by conceiving of  existing objects as parti- 
culars and purging the mind of  abstractions can the objects be under- 
stood clearly. 41 This corresponds to the corrective task of philos- 
ophy in purifying the imagination of false and confused ideas. 
For both methods of achieving the coherence of ideas Spinoza 
assumes that relations within nature can be comprehended by clear 
ideas of objects. There is no separate need to form ideas of relations, 
and relations apparently have no objective correlate in nature. Thus 
in the E t h i c s  Spinoza divided the world into substance, attribute and 
mode. Relations among ideas and objects - the ordering which was 
itself the philosophical task of the E t h i c s  - falls outside of this 
classification. The doctrine of internal relations (which is suggested 
by Spinoza's treatment but never stated expressly) makes the reality 
of judgments of equality inherently problematic. Their truth lies 
only in the coherence of the thoughts compared and is a result of 
the process of  comparison - but comparison is heuristically suspect 
because of the denial of reality of relations.42 
However, there is some evidence that in later years Spinoza 
became dissatisfied with his earlier theory of relations. In his later 
study of Hebrew linguistics, Spinoza established relations as a separ- 
ate epistemological category alongside things, attributes and 
modes. 4a Relations as well as modes can be expressed with a sub- 
stantive: they can be understood. Moreover, it is also only in 
Spinoza's last writing that he adopts the use of the substantive equal- 
i t y  (aequa l i ta s ) .  44 He uses the substantive only in the context of 
discussing political equality among individuals and groups or classes 
of individuals. 
3. The instability of equality - Recognition of a substantive 
equality in politics threatens the analogical operation of the four 
equals. For substantive equality elaborated as an end of political 
institutions has no conceptual parallel in the root analogy of 
geometric equality. Indeed the hypostatization of the relationship as 
a substantive conflicts radically with the treatment of equality in the 
root analogy where the relation was ultimately dissolved as a sort of 
illusion wrought by imaginative thought. 
The substantiation of political equality as a central feature of 
political theory introduces instability into the overarching analogical 
function of equals in Spinoza's theory. We can attempt to resolve 
the instability by means of biographical bifurcations of earlier and 
laer writings and by means of dissociating writings on political 
theory and metaphysics. But these external resolutions of the con- 
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fl ic t  also serve to  obscure  t he  close gene t ic  re la t ion  o f  the  wr i t ings  
and  the  analogical  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  the  equals  p lay  even  as t h e y  
t h r e a t e n  to  come  apa r t .  
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL 
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NOTES 
* I want to thank Dr. Robert C. Stoddart for help with Latin. 
1 The literature on Spinoza's metaphysics is endless, though philosophical 
interest in his writings seems to have decreased in recent decades. There are 
many excellent general discussions of Spinoza's political ideas. Yet one 
reason why his treatment of equality has not  been previously investigated 
is related to the tendency of most writers to dissociate Spinoza's meta- 
physics and his political theory - or else to subordinate one to the other. 
For example, McShea finds Spinoza's real political philosophy to lie in his 
ethics. Robert J. McShea, The PoliticalPhtTosophy of Spinoza (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 204. And Zac, on the contrary, 
characterizes the Ethics as a polemical work. Sylvain Zae, Philosophic, thd- 
ologie, potitique clans l'oeuvre de Spinoza (Paris: J. Vrin, 1979), p. 117. 
Moreover, interpretations of Spinoza's political theory have tended to 
exaggerate certain individualist and mystical aspects and to ignore the 
pervasive theme of political egalitarianism. I hope to challenge this pre- 
vailing view of Spinoza's politics in another essay. Here I only observe its 
contribution to the neglect of Spinoza's treatment of equality. The histor- 
ical roots of  this view lie in nineteenth~eentury interpretations of Spinoza's 
metaphysics. See, for example, Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and 
Philosophy (London: Kegan Paul, 1880), p. 368. This interpretation was 
reinforced this century by Strauss, who sought and found incongruities in 
Spinoza's idea of natural right. Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, 
trans. E. Sinclair (New York: Sehoeken, 1965), pp. 230 ,243 -44 .  
2 Although I use the substantive throughout, Spinoza rarely used "equal" 
other than adjectivally. He used gelykmatigheid once in the Short Treatise 
to refer to a relation of equality between ratios. See Carl Gebhardt ed., 
Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), 1:54. He used 
aequalitas, the abstract of aequalis, only in his last work, The Political 
Treatise. See infra n. 44. Location of terms can be verified by Emilia Gian- 
cotti Boscherird, Lexicon Spinozanum, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1970), 1:24. 
As I will suggest in part II, Spinoza's avoidance of the substantive is not 
accidental; it reflects important epistemological assumptions. However, I 
do not  follow his usage in my discussion. 
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Both Dutch and Latin were foreign languages to Spinoza. As far as I can 
tell, he uses both geli]k (or gelyk) and aequalis to mean the same thing. 
Both axe close analogues to the Portugese/guaL The Portugese substantive 
would be igualdad(e). 
s See, eg.,  Short Treatise, Spinoza Opera 1:54; Reeckening van Kanssen, 
Spinoza Opera 4:362; Improvement o f  the Understanding, Spinoza Opera 
2:12; Principles o f  Descartes's Philosophy, Spinoza Opera 1:185. 
4 See, eg., Calculation oftheRainbow, Spinoza Opera 4:354, 356;Improve. 
ment o[ the Understanding, Spinoza Opera 2: 35; Pr~ciples o f  Descartes's 
Philosophy, Spinoza Opera 1:158,204,  266; Ethics, Spinoza Opera 2:61, 
130, 136; Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza Opera 3:252 note. 
5 See, eg. ,  Calculation of  the Rainbow, Spinozd Opera 4:358. Similarly, 
Lines from the center to the radius of  a circle are equal. Improvement o f  the 
Understanding, Spinoza Opera 2:35; Pn'ncipics o f  Deseartes's Philosophy, 
Spinoza Opera 1:158,162. See discussion in part II. 
Short Treatise, Spinoza Opera 1:19 n. 2. 
Ibid. 
s Ethics Part I props. XII, XIII. 
9 See letter of April 1663 to Meyer in A. Wolf ed., The Correspondence of 
Spinoza (London: Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 121. See also letter of May 
1676 to Tschirnaus, ibid., pp. 362-63 ,  where Spinoza reaffirmed his 
earlier views and clearly related his argument regarding extension to the 
nature of substance. 
~o Ethics Part IV prop. XXV. 
~z Theological-Political Treatise, in The Chief Works o f  Benedict de Spinoza, 
trans. R.M. Elwes, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950-55)  1:119; Spinoza 
Opera 3:117. 
12 Chief Works l:49;Spinoza Opera 3:50. 
~s Equality of creation extends to all nations: "in regard to intellect and true 
virtue, every nation is on a par with the r e s t . . . "  Theological-Political 
Treatise, Chief Works l:56;Spinoza Opera 3:57. The history of  the Jews is 
not marked by a unique relation to God; other nations had prophets. Chief 
Works 1:49, 50, 52; Spinoza Opera 3:50, 51, 53. See also letter to Ostens 
of February 1671: "As regards the Turks and the other Gentiles, if they 
worship God by the exercise of justice and charity towards their neighbor, 
I believe that they have the Spirit of Christ and are saved, whatever convic- 
tions they may in their ignorance h o l d . . . "  Correspondence, p. 259. 
Spinoza also maintained that Christ was sent to all nations. Theological- 
Political Treatise, Chief ;forks 1:53, 64; Spinoza Opera 3:54, 64. Christ 
plays a signal role in Spinoza's theory as the exemplar of  the intuitive 
understanding of  the simple moral principles. 
t+ People are differently affected by the passions, and the same person can be 
differently affected at different times. Ethics Part HI prop. LI. And so far 
as they are assailed by the passions, men "differ in nature." Ethics Part IV 
prop. XXXIII proof, Chief Works 2:208; Spinoza Opera 2:231. To the 
246  
SPINOZA'S IDEA OF EQUALITY 
extent they so differ, people are not in natural harmony. Ethics Part IV 
prop. XXXII. 
This diversity of natural dispositions canplay a positive historical func- 
tion because it prevents the successful manipulation of all persons by a 
tyrannical regime that seeks to subordinate reason by appealing to the 
passions. Not all people respond equally to the sarae external, authoritative 
incentives or threats: "brains are as diverse as palates." Theological-Politic- 
al Treatise, Chief Works 1:257; Spinoza Opera 3:239. The natural diversity 
of people is clearly associated with their passions and imaginative thinking. 
As regards reasoning, they are "equal." 
is See, e g., Short Treatise, Spinoza Opera 1: 109-10. Cf. Ethics Part V prop. 
XLII. 
16 Indeed, in earlier writings, Spinoza characterized reason itself as merely a 
staircase by which we ascend to supreme happiness in union with God. 
Short Treatise, Spinoza Opera 1:109-10. A related epistemological 
problem, which continues in Spinoza's later writings, arises from Spinoza's 
idea of the self-determined mind. As Saisset suggested, Spinoza's analysis 
of the ego threatens to undermine the unity of the ego. In contrast to the 
individual ego that is the starting-point of  Descartes's speculations, 
Spinoza's ego is ultimately dissolved into a multipficity of ideas, l~mile 
Saisset, Pr~curseurs et disciples de Descartes (Paris: Didler, 1862), pp. 
338-39. 
1~ Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza Opera 3: 195. 
Is The Jews were in a state of nature (statu naturalf) after the Exodus, before 
receiving the Law. Ibid. 3:195. My reading clearly conflicts with Zac's 
assertion that for Spinoza the state of nature and social pact had no 
historical referents. See Sylvain Zac, Philosophie, th~ologie, politique clans 
l'oeuvre de Spinoza, p. 133. 
19 Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza Opera 3:189-90;Political Treatise, 
Spinoza Opera 3: 277. 
20 Theological-Political Treatise, Chief Works 1: 73; Spinoza Opera 3:73. 
21 In this Spinoza diverges sharply from Hobbes. See e~., his letter to Jellis 
of  1674, Correspondence, p. 269. For a recent discussion, see Kudo 
Kisaku, "fiber die Staatslehre Spinozas," in Siegfried Hessing ed., Speculum 
Spinozanum 1677-1977 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 
355. 
2= Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza Opera 3: 203. In the Ethics Spinoza 
observed that people naturally envy their equals. Ethics Part III prop. LV 
scholium. And he derived from this the corollary that "No one envies the 
virtue of anyone who is not his equal." Ethics, Chief Works 2: 167; Spinoza 
Opera 2:183. 
2~ Theolgoical-Political Treatise, Spinoza Opera 3:218-20. 
24 For example, he proposed the abolition of all nobility in a monarchy (ex- 
cept for the king's immediate family) "in order that the citizens may be as 
far as possible equa l . . . "  Chief Works 1: 336; Spinoza Opera 3:315. Equali- 
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ty in property relationships is ensured by proh~ition of land ownership. 
Chief Ir 1:336, 331; Spinoza Opera 3:311, 315. For aristocracy 
Spinoza proposed various institutional limitations on the central council in 
order to promote "the greatest possible equality (aequalitas)" among the 
patricians. Chief Works 1:354;Spinoza Opera 3:331. 
2s Spinoza Opera 3:296. 
~6 Ethics, Spinoza Opera 2:209. 
27 Short Treatise, Spinoza Opera 1:40. 
2s Ibid. 1:40. 
29 See especially the discussion of God in the Short Treatise, Spinoza Opera 
1:22, and chapt. 3 (God as Cause of All Things). 
30 Divine providence is partly retained in the Ethics Part I prop. XXIX: 
"Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to 
exist in a particular manner by the necessity of  the divine nature." Chief 
Works 2:68; Spinoza Opera 2:70. But Spinoza immediately qualified this 
by introducing the distinction between natura naturata and natura 
~l  l~ ran s. 
31 Ethics Part IV prop. IV proof. 
~a A schematic diagram might illustrate some of the interactions of Spinoza's 
analogical use of equality, though I believe the analogy is actually richer 
than the connections suggested by the schema: 
politics 
right .......... power 
^ <_ > ^ 
ratiocination equality 




measurement ........ proportion 
geometry 
33 Ethics Part II prop. XLIX proof, Spinoza Opera 2: 130. 
Improvement o f  the Understanding, Spinoza Opera 2:35. 
3s For Spinoza the first definition exposes the absurdity of taking Euclidean 
definitions to correspond to real things in space. For if an infinity of points 
establishes the continuity of  circumference, the infinitely narrow line that 
intersects the circumference must be still more inVmitely narrow as it 
approaches the center. 
Another way to sympathize with Spinoza's dislike of the first def'mition 
is to try to imagine a circle as a limit of a planar f'~ure composed of the 
largest inf'mity of points the total distance of which from a common point 
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is the smallest possible infinity. It is, Spinoza would think, impossible to 
construct meh a figure in the imagination. 
36 Ethics Part 1V def'mition VI,Spinoza Opera 2:210. 
~7 Letter of April 1663 to Meyer, Correspondence, p. 118. 
38 Ibid. 
39 This suggests, of course, that for Spinoza the geometric method itself is in 
some sense propadeutic and not adequate for genuine philosophical under- 
standing. I disagree with Stirling's interpretation of the "secret of Spinoza" 
as a mathematical-geometric conception of the world. See Albert Sehwog- 
let, Handbook of  the History of  Philosophy, trans, and annotated by James 
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